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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/2108/84

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contributor.authorValente, Simone-
date.accessioned2005-10-19T11:58:57Z-
date.available2005-10-19T11:58:57Z-
date.issued2005-02-05-
identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2108/84-
description.abstractThis paper studies the welfare properties of distortionary transfers in a life-cycle growth model where natural capital is private property. The main result is that, under credible pre-commitment, each newborn generation prefers positive taxes-subsidies to laissez-faire conditions when the resource share in production is suffciently high. By increasing the degree of natural preservation, resource-saving policies raise welfare of all generations except that of the first resource owner, who su®ers a deadweight loss due to taxation of the initial stock. If the first owner renounces part of his claims over initial endowments, all successive generations support resource-saving policies for purely selfish reasonsen
format.extent270628 bytes-
format.mimetypeapplication/pdf-
language.isoenen
publisherCEISen
relation.ispartofseriesQuaderni CEISen
relation.ispartofseries214en
subjectdistortionary taxationen
subjectintergenerational transfersen
subjectoverlapping generationen
subjectrenewable resourcesen
subjectsustainabilityen
titleIntergenerational transfers, lifetime welfare and resource preservationen
typeWorking Paperen
subject.jelH3; Fiscal policies and behavior of economic agentsen
subject.jelQ2; Renewable resources and conservation, environmental managementen
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