DSpace - Tor Vergata: Item 2108/59

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DC Field	Value	Language
contributor.author	De Sinopoli, Francesco	-
contributor.author	Iannantuoni, Giovanna	-
date.accessioned	2005-10-17T08:51:04Z	-
date.available	2005-10-17T08:51:04Z	-
date.issued	2003-08	-
identifier.uri	http://ssrn.com/abstract=428580	-
identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/2108/59	-
description.abstract	In this paper we show that in a simple spatial model where the government is chosen under strict proportional rule, if the outcome function is a linear combination of parties' positions, with coefficient equal to their share of votes, essentially only a two-party equilibrium exists. The two parties taking a positive number of votes are the two extremist ones. Applications of this result include an extension of the well-known Alesina and Rosenthal model of divided government as well as a modified version of Besley and Coate's model of representative democracy. Different outcome functions are then analyzed.	en
format.extent	542355 bytes	-
format.mimetype	application/pdf	-
language.iso	en	en
publisher	CEIS	en
relation.ispartofseries	CEIS Tor Vergata Research Paper	en
relation.ispartofseries	31	en
subject	voting	en
subject	proportional rule	en
subject	Nash equilibria	en
title	A Spatial voting model where proportional rule leads to two-party equilibria	en
type	Article	en
subject.jel	C72; Noncooperative games	en
subject.jel	D72; Economic models of political processes: rent-seeking, elections, legislatures, and voting behavior	en
Appears in Collections:	Research papers

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