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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/2108/59

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contributor.authorDe Sinopoli, Francesco-
contributor.authorIannantuoni, Giovanna-
date.accessioned2005-10-17T08:51:04Z-
date.available2005-10-17T08:51:04Z-
date.issued2003-08-
identifier.urihttp://ssrn.com/abstract=428580-
identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2108/59-
description.abstractIn this paper we show that in a simple spatial model where the government is chosen under strict proportional rule, if the outcome function is a linear combination of parties' positions, with coefficient equal to their share of votes, essentially only a two-party equilibrium exists. The two parties taking a positive number of votes are the two extremist ones. Applications of this result include an extension of the well-known Alesina and Rosenthal model of divided government as well as a modified version of Besley and Coate's model of representative democracy. Different outcome functions are then analyzed.en
format.extent542355 bytes-
format.mimetypeapplication/pdf-
language.isoenen
publisherCEISen
relation.ispartofseriesCEIS Tor Vergata Research Paperen
relation.ispartofseries31en
subjectvotingen
subjectproportional ruleen
subjectNash equilibriaen
titleA Spatial voting model where proportional rule leads to two-party equilibriaen
typeArticleen
subject.jelC72; Noncooperative gamesen
subject.jelD72; Economic models of political processes: rent-seeking, elections, legislatures, and voting behavioren
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