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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/2108/59
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| Title: | A Spatial voting model where proportional rule leads to two-party equilibria |
| Authors: | De Sinopoli, Francesco
Iannantuoni, Giovanna |
| Keywords: | voting
proportional rule
Nash equilibria |
| Issue Date: | Aug-2003 |
| Publisher: | CEIS |
| Series/Report no.: | CEIS Tor Vergata Research Paper
31 |
| Abstract: | In this paper we show that in a simple spatial model where the government is chosen under strict proportional rule, if the outcome function is a linear combination of parties' positions, with coefficient equal to their share of votes, essentially only a two-party equilibrium exists. The two parties taking a positive number of votes are the two extremist ones. Applications of this result include an extension of the well-known Alesina and Rosenthal model of divided government as well as a modified version of Besley and Coate's model of representative democracy. Different outcome functions are then analyzed. |
| URI: | http://ssrn.com/abstract=428580
http://hdl.handle.net/2108/59 |
| Appears in Collections: | Research papers
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| ssrn-id428580.pdf | | 529Kb | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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