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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/2108/59

Title: A Spatial voting model where proportional rule leads to two-party equilibria
Authors: De Sinopoli, Francesco
Iannantuoni, Giovanna
Keywords: voting
proportional rule
Nash equilibria
Issue Date: Aug-2003
Publisher: CEIS
Series/Report no.: CEIS Tor Vergata Research Paper
Abstract: In this paper we show that in a simple spatial model where the government is chosen under strict proportional rule, if the outcome function is a linear combination of parties' positions, with coefficient equal to their share of votes, essentially only a two-party equilibrium exists. The two parties taking a positive number of votes are the two extremist ones. Applications of this result include an extension of the well-known Alesina and Rosenthal model of divided government as well as a modified version of Besley and Coate's model of representative democracy. Different outcome functions are then analyzed.
URI: http://ssrn.com/abstract=428580
Appears in Collections:Research papers

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