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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/2108/52

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contributor.authorScaramozzino, Pasquale-
contributor.authorVulkan, Nir-
date.accessioned2005-10-07T11:42:40Z-
date.available2005-10-07T11:42:40Z-
date.issued2003-03-
identifier.urihttp://ssrn.com/abstract=386281-
identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2108/52-
description.abstractThis paper presents a model of co-ordination failures based on market power and local oligopoly. The economy exhibits a multiplicity of Pareto-ranked equilibria. The introduction of uncertainty generates an endogenous equilibrium selection process, due to a strategic use of information by firms. The economy is more likely to settle on some equilibria than on others. We argue that a full understanding of these robustness criteria is needed before any policy which is intended to help co-ordinate the level of activity to a Pareto dominant outcome can be successfully implemented.en
format.extent304752 bytes-
format.mimetypeapplication/pdf-
language.isoenen
publisherCEISen
relation.ispartofseriesCEIS Tor Vergata Research Paperen
relation.ispartofseries5en
subjectmicrofoundationsen
subjectco-ordination failureen
subjectequilibrium selectionen
titleUncertainty and endogenous selection of economic equilibriaen
typeArticleen
subject.jelC7; Game theory and bargaining theoryen
subject.jelE00; Macroeconomics and monetary economics. Generalen
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