DSpace - Tor Vergata: Item 2108/52

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DC Field	Value	Language
contributor.author	Scaramozzino, Pasquale	-
contributor.author	Vulkan, Nir	-
date.accessioned	2005-10-07T11:42:40Z	-
date.available	2005-10-07T11:42:40Z	-
date.issued	2003-03	-
identifier.uri	http://ssrn.com/abstract=386281	-
identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/2108/52	-
description.abstract	This paper presents a model of co-ordination failures based on market power and local oligopoly. The economy exhibits a multiplicity of Pareto-ranked equilibria. The introduction of uncertainty generates an endogenous equilibrium selection process, due to a strategic use of information by firms. The economy is more likely to settle on some equilibria than on others. We argue that a full understanding of these robustness criteria is needed before any policy which is intended to help co-ordinate the level of activity to a Pareto dominant outcome can be successfully implemented.	en
format.extent	304752 bytes	-
format.mimetype	application/pdf	-
language.iso	en	en
publisher	CEIS	en
relation.ispartofseries	CEIS Tor Vergata Research Paper	en
relation.ispartofseries	5	en
subject	microfoundations	en
subject	co-ordination failure	en
subject	equilibrium selection	en
title	Uncertainty and endogenous selection of economic equilibria	en
type	Article	en
subject.jel	C7; Game theory and bargaining theory	en
subject.jel	E00; Macroeconomics and monetary economics. General	en
Appears in Collections:	Research papers

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