DSpace - Tor Vergata: Item 2108/364

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/2108/364

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DC Field	Value	Language
contributor.author	Brose, Isabel	-
contributor.author	D'Amato, Alessio	-
contributor.author	Franckx, Laurent	-
date.accessioned	2007-08-01T14:56:10Z	-
date.available	2007-08-01T14:56:10Z	-
date.issued	2005-12	-
identifier.uri	http://ssrn.com/abstract=871400	-
identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/2108/364	-
description.abstract	We consider environmental regulation of n risk-averse, multiple pollutant firms. We develop a yardstick competition scheme where the regulatory scheme depends on the difference between a firm's aggregate performance and the average aggregate performance of the industry. Whether this instrument dominates Pigouvian taxation depends on the complete structure of the covariance matrix of the common random terms in measured pollution. Moreover, if the number of firms is large enough, the yardstick scheme is always superior to Pigouvian taxation. This analysis also provides new arguments in favor of strict liability rather than negligence liability as a regulatory tool.	en
format.extent	1153792 bytes	-
format.mimetype	application/pdf	-
language.iso	en	en
publisher	CEIS	en
relation.ispartofseries	CEIS Tor Vergata Research Paper; 77	en
subject	asymmetric information	en
subject	environmental regulation	en
subject	multi-tasking	en
subject	yardstick competition	en
title	Multi pollutant yardstick schemes as environmental policy tools	en
type	Article	en
Appears in Collections:	Research papers

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