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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/2108/290

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contributor.authorD'Amato, Alessio-
contributor.authorValentini, Edilio-
date.accessioned2006-10-03T09:51:42Z-
date.available2006-10-03T09:51:42Z-
date.issued2006-05-24-
identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2108/290-
description.abstractThis paper deals with the issue of whether the power of allocating tradeable emission permits within a federal system (or an economic union) should be centralized or delegated to the single states/nations. To this end, we develop a simple two stage game played by two governments and their respective industries producing a homogeneous output that is sold in a third country. We show that when emission permits are traded competitively at a federal (or economic union) level, a decentralized emission trading system (DETS) would result in a lower than optimal price of permits, as well as in an aggregate emission target which is larger than the socially optimal target that would arise under a centralized system (CETS). This result partly hinges on standard international externality considerations; on the other hand, we find a new "channel" through which decentralized permits distribution could lead to distortions: under a DETS, national governments play a Cournot game, and choose the amount of allowances to be distributed to domestic firms without accounting for the spillover such distribution generates on the other country via the price of allowances.en
format.extent164424 bytes-
format.mimetypeapplication/pdf-
language.isoenen
publisherCEISen
relation.ispartofseriesQuaderni CEIS; 235-
subjectemissions tradingen
subjectenvironmental dumpingen
subjectenvironmental federalismen
titleThe Allocation of tradeable emission permits within federal systems (or economic unions)en
typeArticleen
subject.jelF18; Trade and environmenten
subject.jelQ5; Environmental economicsen
Appears in Collections:Quaderni

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