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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/2108/203

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contributor.authorHainz, Christa-
contributor.authorKleimeier, Stefanie-
description.abstractWhy do bank grant project finance loans to borrowers in risky countries? Our double moral hazard model predicts that project finance is optimal if the degree of moral hazard of the firm’s manager is high and either the project faces high levels of political risk or the bank has influence over the political risk exposure of the project. Using a global and a transition economy sample of project finance loans from 1980 to 2003, we find empirical support of our predictions regarding firm moral hazard and political risk. Regarding the bank’s role only the influence of the IFC is significant.en
format.extent568090 bytes-
relation.ispartofseriesQuaderni CEIS; 197-
subjectproject financeen
subjectsyndicated loansen
subjectpolitical risken
subjectinternational financeen
subjectdouble moral hazarden
subjecttransition economiesen
subject.classificationSECS-P/11; Economia degli intermediari finanziarien
titlePolitical risk in syndicated lending: theory and empirical evidence regarding the use of project financeen
subject.jelD82; Asymmetric and private informationen
subject.jelF34; International lending and debt problemsen
subject.jelG21; Banks, other depository institutions, mortgagesen
subject.jelG32; Financing policy, capital and ownership structureen
title.release2nd. rev. ed.-
Appears in Collections:Quaderni

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