DSpace - Tor Vergata: Item 2108/141

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/2108/141

Full metadata record

DC Field	Value	Language
contributor.author	Iozzi, Alberto	-
date.accessioned	2005-11-28T11:13:35Z	-
date.available	2005-11-28T11:13:35Z	-
date.issued	2000-12	-
identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/2108/141	-
description.abstract	I analyse a two-stage location-price duopoly game under uniform delivered pricing when firms produce homogenous goods and are unable to ration the supply. Two tie-breaking rules (TBR) are studied: consumers either buy from the nearest firm or buy from either firms with equal probabilities. Under the first TBR, I find multiple single-price equilibria. Equilibrium locations are shown to be symmetric and to be such that the distance between firms increases (decreases) with the transportation cost (c) when c is high (low). Under the second TBR, firms cluster to the centre of the market line and choose the price that gives them zero profits. Surprisingly, when c is low, consumers are better off when they randomly select from which firm to buy.	en
format.extent	223530 bytes	-
format.mimetype	application/pdf	-
language.iso	en	en
publisher	CEIS	en
relation.ispartofseries	Quaderni CEIS; 128	-
subject	spatial duopoly	en
subject	uniform delivered price	en
subject	rationing	en
subject.classification	SECS-P/01; Economia politica	en
title	Prices and locations in a spatial duopoly under uniform delivered pricing	en
type	Article	en
subject.jel	L13; Oligopoly and other imperfect markets	en
subject.jel	R3; Production analysis and firm location	en
Appears in Collections:	Quaderni

Files in This Item:

File	Description	Size	Format
wp128A5.pdf		218Kb	Adobe PDF	View/Open