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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/2108/141

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contributor.authorIozzi, Alberto-
date.accessioned2005-11-28T11:13:35Z-
date.available2005-11-28T11:13:35Z-
date.issued2000-12-
identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2108/141-
description.abstractI analyse a two-stage location-price duopoly game under uniform delivered pricing when firms produce homogenous goods and are unable to ration the supply. Two tie-breaking rules (TBR) are studied: consumers either buy from the nearest firm or buy from either firms with equal probabilities. Under the first TBR, I find multiple single-price equilibria. Equilibrium locations are shown to be symmetric and to be such that the distance between firms increases (decreases) with the transportation cost (c) when c is high (low). Under the second TBR, firms cluster to the centre of the market line and choose the price that gives them zero profits. Surprisingly, when c is low, consumers are better off when they randomly select from which firm to buy.en
format.extent223530 bytes-
format.mimetypeapplication/pdf-
language.isoenen
publisherCEISen
relation.ispartofseriesQuaderni CEIS; 128-
subjectspatial duopolyen
subjectuniform delivered priceen
subjectrationingen
subject.classificationSECS-P/01; Economia politicaen
titlePrices and locations in a spatial duopoly under uniform delivered pricingen
typeArticleen
subject.jelL13; Oligopoly and other imperfect marketsen
subject.jelR3; Production analysis and firm locationen
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